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T. K. Whitaker and Seán Lemass are generally credited with effecting the policy shift 
from protectionism to outward orientation.  Ireland’s low corporation tax regime, 
however, has its origins in the export profits tax relief (EPTR) measures introduced by 
the second inter-party government in 1956.  EPTR was introduced at the urging of the 
Department of Industry and Commerce in the face of long-standing opposition from 
Revenue and the Department of Finance.  Industry and Commerce at the same time 
successfully thwarted the desires of the Taoiseach, the Department of Finance and 
other state agencies to have restrictions on foreign ownership of industry repealed.  
These apparently contradictory positions were rooted in the historical legacy of 
protectionism.  The inter-party Taoiseach, John A. Costello, downplayed the 
connection between EPTR and foreign investment in an apparent attempt to deprive 
Fianna Fáil of an opportunity for controversy.  Its introduction hastened the end of 
Fianna Fáil prevarication on the issue of foreign ownership.   
 
The importance of the intense electoral competition of the period is also frequently 
ignored in accounts of the policy shift.  Following sixteen years of unbroken Fianna 
Fáil rule, the next four general elections brought four changes of government.  Along 
with the depth of the 1950s recession, this forced Fianna Fáil into a comprehensive 
reexamination of its industrial strategy.  The economic thinking of the major political 
parties co-evolved, and many of the institutional innovations of the period were the 
result of inter-party government initiatives.  
 
The defeat inflicted on Finance by the Department of Industry and Commerce partly  
motivated Finance’s work on Economic Development, the 1958 publication of which 
provided political cover for Fianna Fáil’s U-turn on overall economic strategy. 
 
 
                                                
 This forms part of an IRCHSS-sponsored project: “Turning Globalisation to National Advantage: 
Economic Policy Lessons from Ireland’s Experience.”  I am grateful to Aoife Hannan and Mícheál Ó 
Fathartaigh ￿ for excellent research assistance and to Mary E. Daly, Brian Girvin, Gary Murphy, Andy 
Bielenberg, Liam Kennedy, Henry Patterson, Michael Moore, Louis Cullen and Garret FitzGerald for 
valuable discussions.   1 
Introduction 
The 1958 publication of the Department of Finance document Economic Development 
and the new Fianna Fáil government’s First Programme for Economic Expansion is 
generally heralded as marking the policy shift from protectionism to outward 
orientation.  Conventional wisdom therefore credits T. K. Whitaker and Seán Lemass, 
as the key architects of these documents, with effecting the policy shift.   
 
The underlying story is more complicated.  The dismantling of Ireland’s protectionist 
tariff barriers began only in 1963, five years after the supposed turning point, while 
tax relief for export expansion was introduced by Taoiseach John A. Costello, leader 
of the 2
nd inter-party government, in 1956, two years before the supposed turning 
point.  This tax relief, furthermore, represents the genesis of Ireland’s low corporation 
tax regime which Padraic White, long-serving Managing Director of the IDA, refers 




A recent paper by the present author addresses the question of why tariff barriers 
began to be dismantled only in 1963, though Whitaker had been forcefully arguing the 
case for trade liberalisation for many years.
2  It was only then, the paper argues, that it 
became clear that this was the price to be paid if dominant agricultural interests were 
to achieve their aim of full rather than associate membership of the European 
Economic Community.  Full membership was required if access was to be had to the 
vast subsidy programmes of the emerging Common Agricultural Policy.   
 
The present paper focuses on the bureaucratic and political battles associated with the 
earlier measures – variously termed export profits tax relief (EPTR) or export sales 
relief – to reorient production towards export markets.  There has been as yet no in-
depth study of the controversies and battles surrounding its introduction, though the  
economic histories of the period obviously record its enactment.
3  
 
Proposals for some form of such relief had been circulating since the end of the 
Second World War.  These had been strongly resisted by the Department of Finance 
and the Revenue Commissioners.  Taoiseach John A. Costello’s embrace of the 
proposals represented a significant defeat for Finance at the hands of the Department 
of Industry and Commerce.  There were political complications too.  Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) had aroused suspicion in the early decades of independence. Tariffs 
imposed under the early Cumann na nGaedheal governments had triggered tariff-
jumping FDI and Fianna Fáil introduced the Control of Manufactures Acts upon  
acceding to power to try to ensure that the new industries created by the expansion of 
                                                
1 Ray MacSharry and Padraic White, The Making Of The Celtic Tiger: The Inside Story Of Ireland’s 
Booming Economy, (Cork, 2000),  p. 250.  
2 Frank Barry, “Agricultural Interests and Irish Trade Policy Over The Last Half-Century: A Tale Told 
Without Recourse To Heroes”, Working Papers in British-Irish Studies No. 91, 2009, University 
College Dublin.  T. K. Whitaker, ‘Capital Formation, Saving and Economic Progress’, Journal of the 
Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. XVIX, 1955/1956, pp. 184-209.  See also the 
civil service debates of 1959-60 published as T.K. Whitaker, Protection or Free Trade: The Final 
Battle, (Dublin, 2006). 
3 See e.g. Kieran Kennedy, Thomas Giblin and Deirdre McHugh, The Economic Development of 
Ireland in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1988), p. 63; Liam Kennedy, The Modern Industrialisation 
of Ireland 1940-1988, (Dundalk, 1989), p. 15; Cormac Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road: The Irish Economy 
since the 1920s, (Manchester, 1997), p. 50.   2 
protection would remain under Irish control.   Though the acts were never strictly 
policed, Fianna Fáil remained ambivalent on the issue of foreign ownership into the 
1950s.  Costello, in introducing EPTR, downplayed the connection with foreign 
investment in an apparent attempt to deprive Fianna Fáil of an opportunity for 
controversy.  The Department of Industry and Commerce retained a sense of duty to 
domestic industrialists who had established their concerns on the understanding that 
they would be shielded from direct foreign competition and successfully thwarted the 
desires of the Taoiseach, the Department of Finance and other state agencies to have 
the Control of Manufactures Acts repealed.    
 
Lee contends that Whitaker’s work on Economic Development was motivated at least 
in part by a desire to reestablish the supremacy of the Department of Finance in 
economic policymaking.
4  Though its publication in 1958 seems to have helped to lift 
the prevailing mood of despondency, of arguably greater significance was the political 
cover it provided to Fianna Fáil in implementing its U-turn on overall economic 
strategy. 
 
2.  FDI under Cumann na nGaedheal 
The first Irish tariffs introduced in 1923 duplicated those of Britain, the principal 
exponent of free trade.  Over the following three years a further eleven categories of 
goods were added to the original fifteen to which duties applied and by 1931 a total of 
fifty-nine categories were subject to protective duties.
5    
 
Girvin notes that the expansion of employment in protected sectors was accompanied 
by tariff-jumping FDI, as foreign firms entered to exploit the enhanced profit 
opportunities that protectionism afforded.
6   This was particularly the case in sectors 
such as tobacco, soap and confectionary which, as Daly notes, were dominated by a 
small number of large firms which battled for market share with heavy advertising 
expenditure and the creation of strong brand images.
7  This had apparently not been 
anticipated by the government, and the Department of Industry and Commerce shared 
some of the concerns expressed by Fianna Fáil at these developments.  A thirty page 
analysis prepared by the Department in October 1928 noted how, by the sale of 
domestic firms in protected sectors, “the owners turned into cash for their own pocket 
the concession which they, in common with other firms in the industry, were given by 
the state on national grounds”.
8  To prevent such abuses, departmental officials 
recommended that the minister should be empowered to prohibit such transfers or to 
approve them only after the increased value had been surrendered to the state. 
 
The report’s author, T.J. Barrington, doubted “that the economic penetration which 
has followed on the wake of protection here has yet attained the dimension of a 
national evil”.  He was fearful however that foreign staff might retain the key 
positions within foreign-owned firms and that further tariff-driven industrial 
                                                
4 Joseph Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985: Politics and Society, (Cambridge, 1989), p. 343. 
5 D.J. Maher, The Tortuous Path: the Course of Ireland’s Entry into the EEC, 1948-73, (Dublin, 1986), 
p. 7. 
6 Brian Girvin, Between Two Worlds: Politics and Economy in Independent Ireland, (Dublin, 1989), p. 
65. 
7 Mary E. Daly, “An Irish Ireland for Business?: The Control of Manufactures Acts, 1932 and 1934”, 
Irish Historical Studies (1984), p. 248. 
8 Girvin, Between Two Worlds, p. 67.   3 




Ó Gráda has argued that the differences between the economic policies of Cumann na 
nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil were not as great as is generally supposed.
10  Given the 
globally more protectionist Depression-era environment, restrictions on foreign 




3.  Fianna Fáil and the Control of Manufactures Acts: Theory and Practice 
Seán Lemass, who became Minister for Industry and Commerce on Fianna Fáil’s 
accession to power in 1932, had stated in 1927 that “unless we can ensure that the 
benefits derived from the imposition of protection are reserved for the Irish 
manufacturers as well as the consumers it is a dangerous policy to embark on 
protection”.
12  Given Fianna Fáil’s commitment to protection, it is no surprise that  
legislation to control foreign ownership was among the first matters to be addressed 
by the Department of Industry and Commerce under the new dispensation. 
 
The Control of Manufactures Acts of 1932 and 1934 were designed to ensure that new 
industries established under protectionism would be Irish controlled.  The 1934 act 
closed off the main loophole of the earlier legislation which had allowed foreign firms 
to issue preference shares carrying fixed interest rates and no voting rights.  The later  
act required that more than 50 per cent of all share capital, at least two-thirds of 
voting rights and a majority of directorships be held by Irish citizens.  A new 
manufactures licence granted under the Acts could be subject to various restrictions 
such as maximum allowances for non-domestic content, largely at the discretion of 
the Minister. 
 
The Dáil resisted some of Lemass’ more interventionist tendencies.  Early proposals 
were criticised as vesting too much authority in ministerial hands, and suggestions 
that control might also apply to domestic undertakings and to foreign businesses 
established before the acts were rejected. 
 
Among the arguments advanced against foreign ownership were (i) that subsidiaries 
were unlikely to develop an export trade; (ii) that higher executive positions in these 
companies were less likely to be filled by local staff; (iii) that branch plants would 
disappear rapidly in a downturn; (iv) that they might come to exercise monopoly 
positions in the market; (v) that they would, in Lemass’ words, “render it difficult to 
adopt measures designed to protect national interests when those interests are in 
                                                
9 Ibid., p. 68. 
10 Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: A New Economic History 1780-1939, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 387-88. 
11 In the debate on the Control of Manufactures Bill, McGilligan, who had been Minister for Industry 
and Commerce in the previous government, was particularly critical of the Fianna Fáil proposals 
because of the discretionary powers they allocated to the Minister.  Other available options, he 
suggested, included an “admission” fee,  payment of extra corporation tax, or an extra impost by way 
of income tax (Dáil Éireann, Volume 42, 14 June, 1932, Control of Manufactures Bill, Second Stage). 
12 Daly, “Irish Ireland”, p. 252.   4 
conflict with their own”; and (vi) contradictorily, that they would impose “appalling 
conditions” or else pay wages that native firms could not afford.
13 
 
The acts were never strictly policed however.
14  The onus was on the government to 
prove non-compliance rather than on companies to produce lists of shareholders and 
directors, and no prosecutions were ever pursued under this legislation.  Many foreign 
firms managed to set up in Ireland without recourse to a new manufactures licence by 
adopting a shareholding structure which complied with legislative requirements but 
with merely nominal capital size.  In some cases Irish citizens were nominated by 
foreign concerns to act in their interests.  In others, the trade mark of a foreign brand 
was taken on by an Irish manufacturer subject to the payment of royalties. Foreign 
participation was occasionally rewarded via non-voting shares.  So straightforward 
and preferable was the avoidance of the restrictions of the CMA that some firms 
altered their capital structure to allow for the cancellation of their licences.  A 
majority of foreign companies operated such schemes, which were frequently devised 
by Irish solicitors, most notably Arthur Cox.   
 
As early as 1933, the Federation of Irish Industries was lamenting that the “Control of 
Manufactures Act is merely a scrap of paper”.
15  The official tolerance of evasion was 
indicative of a recognition of the value to the Irish economy of the employment 
generated and of the access to foreign capital and skills that it allowed.
16  With the 
passage of time, Government came to prefer schemes that did not require licences – 
and frequently advised foreign applicants of this – as applications for licences could 
stir up controversy from indigenous businesses.
17 
 
A recent study has attempted to establish the extent of foreign control of Irish industry 
in the late protectionist era.
18   The results support Daly’s assertion that there was 
some foreign participation in all sizeable Irish firms at this time.
19  The study is based 
on the list of firms surveyed by the Committee on Industrial Organisation.  This 
committee, which was established in 1961, surveyed 26 multifirm industries that 
accounted for almost 60 percent of manufacturing employment.  The study divided 
the firms surveyed into three groups.  The first were wholly Irish owned.  The second 
were “new foreign firms” established in the 1950s either with IDA assistance or in 
response to the introduction of export profits tax relief.  The third comprised the 
residual class of protectionist-era firms with substantial external associations.  These 
were firms who received or had at one stage applied for a licence under the Control of 
Manufactures Acts or whose external associations could be identified through internal 
IDA records or through the Irish Times online archive.  The study found that 
protectionist-era foreign industry accounted for around one-third of employment in 
                                                
13 Sources: (i), (ii) and (vi): Daly, ‘Irish Ireland’, pp. 246, 248, 252; (iii), (iv) and (v); Paul Bew and 
Henry Patterson, Seán Lemass and the Making of Modern Ireland 1945–66,  (Dublin, 1982), pp. 3, 123, 
124. 
14 This paragraph is based on Daly, ‘Irish Ireland’.   
15 National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Ind&Comm/ TID/1207/199 
16 J. Peter Neary and Cormac Ó Gráda, “Protection, economic war and structural change: The 1930s in 
Ireland”, Irish Historical Studies, 27, (1991), pp. 250–266. 
17 Daly, ‘Irish Ireland’, p. 267 
18 Frank Barry, Linda Barry and Aisling Menton,  “Foreign Ownership and External Associations of 
Irish Business Under Protectionism”, paper delivered to the 2010 annual conference of the Irish 
Economic Association. 
19 Daly, ‘Irish Ireland’, p. 266.   5 
the sectors studied (with “new foreign firms” excluded).  Furthermore, and in line 
with economic theory,  advertising-intensive and R&D-intensive sectors were foreign-
dominated.
20   
 
While the acts were clearly not strictly enforced therefore, the fact that they remained 
on the statute books – and that the Department of Industry and Commerce would fight 
so strenuously against their repeal – indicates that they played a role in ensuring that 
foreign industry did not encroach unduly onto territory carved out by domestic firms. 
 
 4.  Export Profits Tax Relief: Industry & Commerce versus Finance  
The proposal for export profits tax relief first surfaced in a 1945 Foreign Trade 
(Development) Bill prepared by Industry and Commerce. The proposal was that 
exporters to countries other than Great Britain could apply to the Minister for 
exemption from corporation profits tax and local authority rates on premises used for 
the production of goods for the export trade, subject to certain conditions on quality, 
grading and presentation. 
 
The Department of Finance response described the proposals as “objectionable in 
principle”.  While accepting the view that financial assistance from public funds 
might be necessary to stimulate exports, “this assistance should take the form either of 
a direct subsidy which can be effectively measured or of loans and grants analogous 
to those in operation in Northern Ireland”.  Industry and Commerce, in its second 
submission of the bill, noted that the Minister had reconsidered and would not press 
ahead with the proposal.
21 
 
In September 1949 the recently-appointed Industrial Development Authority 
submitted an interim report to the Minister for Industry and Commerce who furnished 
it to government.
22  The IDA noted that they had been in discussions with various 
parties including Irish-American businessmen, a US agency with connections to 
leading American industrialists, officials of the OEEC and a Czechoslovak resident of  
Ireland who had knowledge of the successful export organisation that had been 
established in that country prior to the war.  It surmised that financial inducements 
were needed “to attract products to the export pool”.  These could take the form of 
“tax remission on profits of export trade, a bonus on currencies arising from exports, 
or a guarantee against the risk of defaulting debtors.”  IDA representations to the 
inter-departmental Foreign Trade Committee in November 1949 met with a hostile 
response from Finance however, which pointed out that the Committee “could only 
speak on matters covered by its departmental members (and) could not deal with 




The UK authorities limited the convertibility of sterling in August 1947 and informed 
Dublin that while they hoped to continue to provide conversion facilities for essential 
requirements, Irish requests would have to be “as low as possible”.
24  The dollar 
                                                
20 See e.g. James Markusen, “Multinational Firms, Location and Trade”, The World Economy, 21 (6) 
1998, pp. 733-756. 
21 NAI, Taois/S13765A 
22 NAI, Taois/S11752A 
23 Ibid. 
24 Bernadette Whelan, Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947-57, (Dublin, 2000), p. 83.   6 
shortage was exacerbated by the devaluation of sterling in September 1949 and the 
imminent termination of Marshall Aid flows, and the first inter-party government 
responded in 1950 by establishing the Dollar Exports Advisory Committee.
25 
 
The second report of the committee, which was furnished to the Department of 
Finance in August, recommended the granting of a tax concession on all profits 
earned by exports or re-exports which earned dollars for the country.  Finance passed 
the report to the Revenue Commissioners for their views.  The response of 16 
September notes the similarity between this proposal and the earlier Foreign Trade 
(Development) Bill and states that “the objections put forward on the previous 
occasion still hold good”.  Revenue argued that it would violate the basic principles of 
income taxation and would represent a subsidy whose costs would be hidden.  It 
would open the door to other demands for special treatment and “the relief would be 
more or less in the nature of a gift” for existing exporting concerns.  It pointed out, 
furthermore, that it might run the risk of a countervailing US duty and that a similar 
proposal had been rejected recently by the UK.
26 
 
Lemass, who was back in position as Minister for Industry and Commerce in 1952, 
noted that EPTR “is under consideration but, while it has, as you might expect, my 
sympathetic interest, it offers very substantial difficulties from the viewpoint of the 
Minister for Finance.”
27  Other bodies continued to press for special treatment of 
exports however.  The majority report of the Commission for Emigration published in 
1954 advised, in paragraph 396, that “efforts to develop the export trade in the future 
may make it desirable to rely to a greater extent on (forms such as) direct state 
assistance”.
28  A Committee of Inquiry into Taxation on Industry had been established 
in 1953 and a submission from the Irish Exporters’ Association proposed that “a relief 
be granted to exporters against the total assessable income tax and CPT or surcharge.., 
such relief to be calculated on a sliding scale based on the ratio of export sales to 
domestic sales in their turnover”.
29   The Committee reported in April 1956.  While 
agreeing that it was necessary to encourage industrial exports, it supported the 
Revenue position, which it recorded in Paragraph 171, doubting that “income taxation 
provided the most suitable channel for concessions of this nature”.
30   
 
In a major policy speech delivered to an Inter-Party meeting on 5 October 1956 
however, Taoiseach John A. Costello overruled the long-standing Revenue and 
Finance position and announced that EPTR would be introduced.
31  McCarthy reports 
that Costello relied only on his personal advisors, son-in-law Alexis Fitzgerald and 
Paddy Lynch, in preparing the speech and did not discuss it with other members of the 
                                                
25 Ibid., pp. 224, 400.  
26 NAI, Fin/F49/1/51 
27 Quoted by Girvin, ‘Between Two Worlds’, p. 174. 
28 Cited in “Remission of Taxation on Profits Derived from Export Trade”, a document prepared by the 




31 Though Lemass had withdrawn his own proposals for EPTR in the face of opposition from the 
Department of Finance, he had nevertheless criticised Sweetman, the inter-party Minister for Finance, 
for rejecting the proposals of the Irish Exporters'  Association (Dáil Éireann - Volume 157 - 05 June, 
1956; Finance Bill, 1956—Second Stage).   7 
government prior to delivery.
32  A background document on the  policy suggestions 
contained in Costello’s private papers notes that: 
 “Once you reject the principle of the Revenue Commissioners that no 
distinction should be made in the value of any income from the national 
point of view I think the Government has great scope for differential taxes 
calculated to encourage the earning of particular kinds of incomes and 
discourage the earning of other kinds.  It is obvious that the man whose 
energy is employed in getting foreign markets for our goods is in fact 
doing a service to the economy and should not be taxed at the same rate as 
the man who employs his energies in persuading Irish people to buy a 
greater quantity of imports from abroad.”
33  
 
The October speech states that “the expansion of exports generally is so necessary not 
merely to raise the levels of home employment and income, but also to lessen the 
immediate difficulties of our balance of payments that the Government has decided to 
stimulate such expansion by a special tax incentive.  This incentive will operate for a 
period of 5 years…  It will take the form of a remission of 50% income tax on profits 
of a manufacturing industry derived from increased exports over a datum year and 
used for the expansion of the industry .”
34    The speech also announced that the 
existing industrial grants scheme was to be extended beyond the ‘undeveloped areas’ 
in the west of Ireland to the entire country. 
 
The relief for increased exports only disappointed the Irish Exporters’ Association, 
though it met the objections raised by Finance and Revenue over windfall gains for 
existing exporters.  The provisions, minus the restriction on the use of profits, were 
enacted in the Finance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of December 1956.
35 
 
Minister for External Affairs Liam Cosgrave and T.K. Whitaker at Finance worried 
that EPTR would be in breach of commitments entered into with the OEEC.
36  The 
OEEC had concentrated its initial trade liberalisation efforts on the removal of 
quantitative import restrictions and had achieved substantial success in this regard.  A 
system of liberalisation percentages was adopted, with 1948 selected as the datum 
year. By the end of 1955, 86 per cent liberalisation had been achieved, with five 
member countries including Ireland having reached or exceeded the 90 percent target.  
As Maher notes however, “the suppression of quantitative import restrictions is much 
                                                
32 John McCarthy, ed., Planning Ireland’s Future: the Legacy of T.K. Whitaker, (Dublin, 1990), p. 29.  
(McCarthy has confirmed to the present author that this information was provided to him by Costello in 
an interview).  The background document discussed below makes it clear that his advisors were aware 
of the official correspondence on the issue. 
33 Costello papers, UCD, P190/713(8).  This document also suggests that EPTR might be extended to 
the insurance industry.  (“In the case of a British company, the earnings in Britain would become, if the 
business were conducted from Dublin, foreign earnings”).   This concession was also advocated 
unanimously by the Consultative Committee of CTT (Córas Tráchtála), meeting on 25 October 1956, 
but was not ultimately granted; NAI, Ind&Comm/E/22/3/74.   
34 Costello papers, UCD, P190/781.  Profits at the time were subject to a corporate profits tax of 10% 
and income tax of 37.5%; NAI Ind&Comm/E/22/3/74. 
35 NAI, Taois/S/14818A,B,C 
36 Costello papers, UCD, P190/760/5, and NAI, Fin/F200-13-56.  Whitaker had been promoted to the 
position of Secretary of the Department of Finance earlier that year on the recommendation of 
Sweetman, in a departure from standard procedures that would have seen the position go to the next in 
line (Lee, Ireland 1912-85, p. 342).   8 
easier for a high-tariff country than for a low-tariff country".
37  Liberalisation of tariff 
barriers would prove much more difficult.
38 
 
The commitment that concerned Cosgrave and Whitaker was the agreement  reached 
in January 1955 that member countries would by the end of the year discontinue 
artificial aids to exporters in the form of measures including the remission of direct 
taxes, though special opt-outs were granted to France, Greece and Turkey.
39  The 
minutes of a meeting of the Foreign Trade Committee in March 1955 note that the 
Government had decided to adhere to the OEEC decision but made it clear that the 
Government interpreted the expression “reasons of national importance” – which 
allowed the agreement to be waived – to include reasons of economic stability.  This 
was conveyed to the OEEC in March 1955.
40   
 
Nothing has been unearthed in the archives to indicate that the OEEC was asked to 
sanction the introduction of EPTR.  The government explored what wiggle room was 
available however.  A 1956 document from the Department of the Taoiseach noted 
that the OEEC undertaking “has not prevented us from introducing an export price 
guarantee scheme for Grade A bacon which may involve the Government in payment 
of 50% of any expenditure falling due under the guarantee.  Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the prohibitions do not apply to France who operates an extensive scheme 
of aids to exporters.”
41  Córas Tráchtála also pointed out that other countries such as 
Germany and Holland remained in breach of the rules.
42   
 
In the event, the OEEC reacted with approval to the signal of a shift towards outward-
orientation.
43  The deputy-secretary general of the organisation stated in December 
1956 that though Ireland could not fundamentally be considered an underdeveloped 
country he accepted that significant industrialisation was required and that this might 
warrant special treatment.
44  The 1957 OEEC report on Ireland records, without 
critical comment, the export tax measures adopted.  It points out that “it is extremely 
important to avoid stimulating new industrial development by measures which, like 
tariff increases – and to some extent the import levies – tend to a more permanent 
system of protection against outside competition..  The main criterion for encouraging 
                                                
37 Maher, Tortuous Path, p. 27. 
38 Ibid., p. 52. 
39 NAI, Taois/S14638N.   
40 NAI, Taois/S14638O.  Lemass criticised the government decision to agree to the OEEC restrictions:  
“I would have thought that the best way of securing interest amongst our industrial producers in export 
possibilities was by a rearrangement of the system of taxes on industrial profits”  (Dáil Éireann - 
Volume 151 - 02 June, 1955; Finance Bill, 1955—Second Stage). 
41 NAI, Taois/S/14818A,B,C 
42 NAI, Ind&Comm/TIC/29505. 
43 By 1958 concerns were being raised at the OEEC, particularly by the Dutch representative, about 
Irish incentives to attract foreign capital, while the Danish representative “hoped that Irish measures to 
stimulate exports were in conformity with OEEC principles” (NAI, DT/S/16446).  Even the OEEC 
report of that year is largely favourable however.  It notes that “some branches – notably certain textile 
industries and vehicles – have recently been able to increase their exports, and further encouragement 
in this direction may be hoped for as a result of the new fiscal incentives for exports and industrial 
investment.”  It again simply records the new tax measures adopted, including the proposals in the 
Customs Free Airport (Amendment) Act to  “provide for the complete exemption from taxation for a 
25 year period of profits derived from new bona fide export businesses using air freight and established 
within the confines of the Free Airport Area.” (NAI, Taois/S/16446). 
44 NAI, Taois/S/16194.   9 
the establishment and development of industries should (be) their capacity to make 
use of available domestic resources to the best advantage and, in most cases, to 
contribute towards external earnings.
45 
 
Finance remained hostile to the measures to the last.  Whitaker wrote to his Minister, 
Gerard Sweetman, in September 1956 that EPTR would further postpone the day 
“when we can bring farming profits within the income tax net” and argues that “it is 
production which should be aided rather than exports”.
46  Sweetman adhered strongly 
to the position of his departmental officials and expressed disappointment at 
Costello’s endorsement of EPTR.  Barry and Garvin are therefore in error in ascribing 
EPTR to Sweetman.
47  Following the speech, he wrote to a cabinet colleague that it 
had left him “with a sense of disappointment”: 
“The Taoiseach’s speech, with its great variety of new bodies, with its 
promises of large grants, striking reliefs from taxation and further 
assistance … foreshadows further expansion of the already inflated 
administrative machinery of the state and new large outlays from public 
funds and losses of revenue through widespread tax concessions..  The 
Taoiseach’s speech will moreover be read by departments as giving them 
the green light to go ahead with expansionist programmes and will 
seriously embarrass the Minister for Finance in his efforts at 
retrenchment.”
48   
 
The following month, Sweetman writes to Whitaker informing him that the export tax 
initiative falls within the scope of the Department and that “legislation must be 
prepared by the Revenue Commissioners forthwith”.  Whitaker complains in 
December that the entire bill has been rushed and responds tetchily to J.C.B. 
MacCarthy, Secretary of Industry and Commerce, on the matter.   
“I will make only two points on your letter: (i) Even though you got the 
CTT report only on 12 November, it would have made a considerable 
difference if it were sent to us then, rather than nine days later… (ii) I 
might add that we did not and indeed could not have sent to Revenue on 
21 November a communication which reached us only on the 22
nd.  I do 
not know why you assume that we have invented a new time machine” 
(italics added).
49   
 
Though McCarthy suggests that the tax innovation represented by EPTR was “cited 
with favour in the Grey Book, as Economic Development came to be called”, the 
relevant section – Appendix 2, Section 7 – in fact merely records the measures then in 
place.
50   
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5.  EPTR, the Control of Manufacturers Acts and the Debate on Foreign 
  Capital   
Industry and Commerce recognised from quite an early stage that EPTR might prove 
attractive to foreign investors.  In its rejoinder to Finance’s rejection of the Dollar 
Exports Advisory Committee’s 1950 recommendations, the Department  noted that “it 
is possible that the granting of the concession may induce foreign enterprise to 
establish in this country industries capable of exporting goods to the dollar area”.
51 
 
Awareness of the growing importance of US investments in Europe was also 
stimulated by documentation submitted to government by the Department of External 
Affairs in July 1955.  This concerned a proposal, agreed to over the following months, 
that Ireland should participate in the US investment guarantee programme, the 
purpose of which was to provide insurance against currency inconvertibility or 
expropriation for new American investments abroad.
52   
 
The department reported that, according to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, the 
stock of US FDI in Europe stood at  around $1,720 million in 1950, of which Ireland 
attracted only around $5 million.  “While the need for increased investment in our 
economy is recognised, particularly in the industrial field, it appears that Ireland has 
not so far participated to the same extent as other Western European countries in the 
increased flow of American capital”.  Furthermore, the Embassy in Washington 
thought it likely that the US government would extend to American firms investing in 
Europe the 14 percent reduction in taxes then available for US investments in South 




A 1956 report from the IDA on their recent visit to the US records that: 
“Many industrial firms enquired whether any tax concessions were 
available for new industrial undertakings; it was frequently pointed out to 
us that other countries – Puerto Rico was the most frequently quoted – 
gave tax concessions of different types…  In March 1955 the Minister for 
Industry and Commerce requested Finance to being to the notice of the 
Industrial Taxation Commission tax concessions granted by many 
European countries for the purpose of stimulating new investment, either 
by foreigners or by their own nationals.  Accompanying the minute was a 
summary of measures taken by way of tax concessions by Austria, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Britain, Denmark, Germany, Portugal, The 
Netherlands…  If further industrial development is to make a substantial 
contribution to our employment problem, some bolder measures of tax 
concession must be introduced, so as to enable this country to compete 




In the political realm however, Fianna Fáil had yet to develop a coherent policy on 
foreign investment.  The other main parties were unambiguously in favour, and Fine 
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Gael – and Costello in particular – felt that the Control of Manufactures Acts hindered 
possibilities in this regard.  As early as 1948 he had described the Acts as “outmoded 
and outdated” and “humbug”, though an American diplomat reported at the time that 
repeal would be difficult because of strident opposition from Lemass and the 
Federation of Irish Manufacturers.
55   
 
In the Fine Gael 1953 document Blueprint for Prosperity, Costello argued that “the 
sole consequence of the present Statutes is that the best type of foreign enterprise is 
kept out while any slick merchant who wishes to do so can adopt any one of 100 legal 
devices of overcoming the statutes.  We should make the economy attractive ground 
for the employment of capital no matter who subscribes it”.
56  
 
Bew and Patterson note that it was William Norton – leader of the Labour party and 
Inter-Party Minister for Industry and Commerce – rather than Lemass who made the 
first sustained attempt to bring overseas investment to Ireland.
57   “Since 1948”, they 
write, “Lemass had been prepared to ruminate rather indecisively in public on the 
possible role of foreign capital in the Irish economy.”
58  In a speech delivered at a 
luncheon held by Messrs. Lincoln and Nolan, Ltd., assemblers of Austin and Rover 
cars, on 31
st April, 1953, Lemass said that  
“At one time it was thought necessary to impose restrictions on foreign 
investment here.  The necessity appeared to arise from the dangers that the 
development of a protectionist policy would lead to the establishment here 
of branch factories which would be owned abroad and limited in their 
expansion to the scope of the tariff which produced them and designed to 
disappear if and when that tariff was removed.  They had long since 
passed out of that stage of development and they could now contemplate 
external investment in Irish industry when that investment gave new scope 




His 1953 trip to the US had been partly aimed at attracting American investment, yet 
his Dáil speeches from the opposition benches in the summer of 1955 criticised the 
then Tánaiste’s efforts towards this same end.
60  In defending Norton, Costello 
pointed out that complete national control of industry was “incompatible with our 
large-scale emigration, our substantial unemployment and our expressed 
determination to provide a decent livelihood for our people” and noted that the most 
recent OEEC report had also called for greater attention to be devoted to attracting 
foreign direct investment.   
 
Costello’s Dáil speeches drew attention to the lack of coherence in Fianna Fáil 
attitudes:  
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“Deputy Lemass criticised our policy this afternoon in reference to foreign 
capital, to our desire to get foreign capital into this country. He made 
rather an attack upon those powerful companies who are coming into this 
country and who, we hope, are going to do great good by their project for 
building the oil refinery…  Why does not Deputy Lemass come out and 
say: we are all agreed on the necessity for getting foreign capital in here to 
supplement our own people' s savings; we are all in favour of a particular 
type of manufacture here which will not in any way interfere with our 
own native industrialists; we are all in favour of foreign capitalists 
manufacturing here for export abroad but how will that adversely affect 
our industrialists?.. Why does he not say that he has now come to the 
conclusion that he is not averse to a modification of the Control of 
Manufactures Act, in order that we may all come together and be all on 
the one line, in order that we may present a united front to those people 
who may be prepared to come in here?
61 
 
The Statist, a British news weekly, commented on the “disquieting inference” to be 
drawn from a statement that Lemass made on the transfer of profits to foreign 
shareholders, and noted that “the inference is not likely to encourage British or 
American investors to take up Mr. Norton’s invitation, especially in view of the fact 
that Mr Lemass is the most likely man to succeed Mr de Valera..”
62  
 
Fianna Fáil prevarication on foreign capital is also evident in a Dáil speech of Deputy 
Erskine Childers some months later:  
“In the course of the last few months the Minister has, by his various 
declarations, given the people the idea that he looks forward to foreign 
capital investment as a major contribution to further industrial effort here. 
From that standpoint, I think we can only adopt a highly critical attitude…  
 
In view of the fact that in connection with capital investments from 
abroad, exported interests and profits on them are of no benefit to us in 
our efforts to pay for imports, in view of the fact that certain types of 
capital investments here are likely to be of a fugitive character…, we 
think it is opportune for the Minister... to restate... the principles upon 
which his campaign is based.”
63   
 
The question arises however as to whether Fianna Fáil was really exercised on the 
issue, particularly as US FDI would have engendered much less hostility than British 
control, or whether it was simply seeking to create difficulties for the government.  
Historians of the period report that they have found no evidence of conflict on the 
matter in the Fianna Fáil archives of the time.
64  De Valera, however, as late as 1956, 
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was railing against the government’s handing over Irish resources to foreigners 
‘festooned with tax reliefs’.
65   
 
The desire to avoid controversy presumably explains why Costello in his speech of 
October 1956 avoided explicitly linking EPTR and inward FDI.  The section of the 
speech on Tax Incentives for Exporters makes no mention of foreign industry while 
the later section on External Capital signals retention of the CMA when it notes that 
foreign industries “will undertake here to manufacture goods which our own 
manufacturers are not yet equipped to produce”.
66   This apparent attempt to deprive 
Fianna Fáil of an opportunity for controversy leads McCarthy to conclude that 
Costello’s focus was on Irish businesses and that his vision differed therefore from 
that expressed later by Whitaker in Economic Development.
67   A document in 
Costello’s private papers containing policy suggestions drawn up over the period 
August-September 1956 reveals however that this is not the case.  It calls for “a 
specially favourable tax.. for all profits made out of additional industrial exports over 
a period..  If the rates were made especially favourable such for example as half the 
standard rate, it would make the export trade really attractive.  I would foresee that if 
it were done a great deal of trading would be attracted to Ireland.  I would visualise 
that many English manufacturing concerns would find it worth their while to open 
businesses, i.e. trading companies in Ireland, and so fix their prices that their real 
profits or exports were made here to benefit from the favourable rate, and that we 
would get a lot of extra tax as a consequence” (italics added).
68   
 
Here EPTR and FDI are explicitly linked, and English FDI, furthermore, which would 
certainly have raised Fianna Fáil hackles.  The reference to EPTR’s revenue-raising 
potential is also of significance and will be discussed further below.   Costello’s 
speech avoided the controversy that would surely have followed had this draft been 
delivered.  This seems to have forced Lemass to change tactics.  He now attacks from 
the opposite direction, stating in the Dáil that “the Government' s objectives in putting 
forward this proposal are twofold.  Firstly, to induce existing Irish firms to get into the 
export trade or to extend the scope of their activity in that regard.  Secondly, to induce 
foreign firms to come to this country and use it as a base for export trade.”   He 
argued for even more generous concessions,  in order “to get certain firms now 




The logjam on foreign ownership appears to have been breached. In June 1956 
Lemass had criticised the inter-party government for overemphasising the role that 
foreign capital could play.
70  Similarly, in response to Costello’s October 1956 
speech, he stated that “it is still true that the greater part of our future industrial 
growth will come from the expansion of activities by existing concerns and it is by 
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helping them that the government can get speediest results, if they want results”.
71   
By January 1957, after the passage of EPTR, he was emphasising that export growth 
could not be significantly developed “without linking up with external firms with 
ample financial and technical resources and established connections in the world’s 
markets”.
72  Garret FitzGerald wrote in 1959 that “even if it can be argued with some 
reason that the level of taxation may not have such a significant effect upon domestic 
investment as is sometimes suggested, it is clearly of paramount importance where 
foreign investors are concerned”.
73  This, as has been shown, had been the motivation 
for Costello’s proposals all along. 
 
Why, though, were the Control of Manufacturers Acts not rescinded at this same 
time?  The State investment bank, the ICC, had called for their relaxation in January 
1955.
74  A confidential letter from an official of the Department of Finance to the 
secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach in June 1955 states that “the Governor 
of the Central Bank considers that the operation of the Control of Manufacturers Acts 
has proved a considerable obstacle to the improvement and development of the 
industrial capital market, that the legislation is outmoded and unsound and should be 
repealed rather than amended.  We, too, would prefer to see the Acts repealed (italics 
added).”
75   
 
The Department of the Taoiseach stated in 1954 that “Industry and Commerce give 
indications of a more liberal attitude towards the Acts.  The trouble is, how can a 
liberal non-restrictive attitude, operating via New Manufacturers Licences (under the 
Acts), be reconciled with the restrictive provisions of the Acts.  One or the other must 
give way”.
76  It also found it disturbing that “many factories have been established on 
the basis of a Ministerial assurance that regard would be had to the extent to which the 
market was being met by the factories in question if the question of the issue of a New 
Manufacturers Licence arose at a later date.  The Acts in question do not apparently 
provide for the giving of such an assurance and it would be unfortunate if any 




The consultative committee of Córas Tráchtála meeting on October 25 1956 however, 
while recognising “that the tax rebate would be of value in inducing foreign firms to 
establish manufacturing facilities in this country for export”, warned that “care must 
be taken to ensure that such firms do not thereby obtain an unfair competitive 
advantage over established Irish firms”.
78  In the end, Norton – speaking for the 
Department of Industry and Commerce – won the day in arguing that repeal would be 
“a breach of faith towards those who have set up factories on the basis of the 
existence of the Acts”.
79  
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Like Córas Tráchtála, the Department had argued that repeal “would permit of the 
unfettered investment of outside capital in unsuitable as well as suitable cases and.. 
would constitute a grave threat to existing and future industrial development”.  It 
admitted that the provision of the acts might look formidable to an outsider and 
“might tend to frighten off e.g. American groups contemplating establishment of a 
unit in Europe.  It might accordingly be helpful if it could be brought home to 
potential foreign investors that the Acts are not operated in a restrictive manner and 
that it is the policy of government to encourage the flow of external capital and of 
new techniques and processes into this country, particularly if there are export 
potentialities, and that with a view to encouraging developments of this nature the 
Minister is prepared to grant New Manufacturing Licences”.
80 
 
An example of the Government’s struggle to reassure outside investors that the acts 
were not enforced in an overly restrictive way is provided by a contemporary 
memorandum from the Department of External Affairs to the US authorities.  It stated 
that:  
The principal purpose of the Control of Manufactures Acts was to ensure 
that external interests would not secure an undue share of the ownership 
and control of Irish manufacturing industry.  The Minister for Industry 
and Commerce has power however to authorise the establishment of 
industries under foreign control where he is satisfied that this course is not 
harmful to existing Irish industry.  The Minister’s power in this regard has 
been exercised liberally. In the 20 years since the Acts were passed some 
240 industries controlled externally have been set up.  No sound proposal 
for the establishment of an industry new to this country has been turned 
down merely because control would rest in the hands of non-nationals.  




6.  Aftermath 
As we have seen, the granting of the concession for increased exports only had met 
one of the objections to EPTR raised by Revenue and Finance.  Lemass criticised this 
restriction in a Dáil speech in November 1956:  “In three, four or five years'  time, the 
origin of this measure will be forgotten and we shall merely have a picture of two 
firms side by side doing the same job, one being taxed at double the rate of the other. 
That principle is indefensible.”
82  His dirigiste tendencies are apparent in the 
suggestion that to counter serious losses to the exchequer from existing exports of 
beer, spirits and tobacco,  “we at least urge that the Government should decide the 
particular industries it wants to encourage, that have export possibilities, and give the 
concessions to every firm in these industries.”
83 
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Fianna Fáil did not follow this route upon returning to power.  Instead, its Finance Act 
of 1957 introduced an alternative relief to manufacturers of 25 percent of the tax 
referable to the profits attributable to total exports.
84  McAleese reports however that 
very few firms applied for relief under this scheme and that it had effectively been 
abolished by the early 1970s.
85  Fianna Fáil also expanded the tax remission to 100 
percent from the following year, while the budget statement of 1958 lengthened from 
five to ten years the maximum period of the 100 percent tax exemption.
86   
 
Donaldson could find “no official economic rationale” for this and casts doubt “upon 
the need for Ireland to have increased the tax relief to 100 percent”.
87   The new 
Fianna Fáil Minister for Finance however had circulated to the government a copy of 
an address given in March 1957 by Professor Charles Carter of Queen’s University, 
Belfast, which argued that “by far the most hopeful means of getting good 
management, technical knowledge and capital all at once is from subsidiaries of large 
foreign companies; and it would be worth very large inducements indeed, including 
complete exemption from taxes for a period, to get more of them” (italics added).
 88 
 
The expansion of the tax remission to 100 percent signalled that one component of the 
rationale for the Costello initiative – as revealed in the background document to his 
October 1956  speech, which spoke of the extra tax revenues that the measure might 
raise –  had been overturned.  
 
The Department of Finance continued to fight a rearguard action, particularly against 
this final measure.  Whitaker in a latter to Erskine Childers, Minister for Lands, in 
February 1958, on the opening of a Danish-run fish farm in Ireland, proposes 
proceeding by way of double taxation relief rather than via an exports tax concession.  
“Nothing we can do”, he notes, “will relieve the Danes of all tax on their income from 
the trout farm.  A double taxation agreement would secure that they paid only one tax 
– and that tax to the Irish Exchequer.  The exports tax concession will secure that they 
pay one tax – but to the Danish Exchequer.”  He makes a similar point with respect to 
the Shannon scheme, expressing “great difficulty in understanding how precisely an 
American or British Company operating in Shannon would benefit from remission of 
Irish income or Corporation Profits tax.  The effect of our double taxation agreements 
with these countries would…be to transfer the benefit to the British or American 
Exchequer.”
89  He also argues at this time against extending the relief to publishers, to 
the building and repairing of ships, and to individuals and partnerships.  “Department 
of Finance concerns regarding the policy remain, and remain the same.”
90   
 
With the breaching of the logjam on foreign ownership, many of the restrictions 
imposed by the Control of Manufactures Acts were rescinded with the passage of the 
Industrial Development (Encouragement of External Investment) Act of 1958.  
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Background notes to the bill state that “the Minister... is of the opinion that the 
contribution by externally promoted concerns geared for export is likely to be a 
significant factor and that, in their establishment, the participation of external capital 
must be facilitated.”
91   
 
The 1958 OEEC report on Ireland notes nevertheless that “despite the recent 
relaxation of restrictions, the conditions governing foreign investment in Ireland are 
still more restrictive than would seem appropriate in the light of Ireland’s overriding 
need for new investment and enterprise’.
92   The Control of Manufactures Acts were 
repealed completely by an act of 1964 which provided that they would cease to 
operate in 1968. 
 
Conclusions 
The defeat inflicted on the Department of Finance by Industry and Commerce over 
EPTR contextualises Lee’s discussion of some of the less obvious motivations behind 
Economic Development: “Whitaker had not become Secretary of Finance to preside 
over the decline of the premier Department.  It was therefore necessary in terms of 
administrative politics to seize the initiative for Finance with a positive approach..  
Already in May 1957, Whitaker was urging his Assistant Secretaries that it was 
desirable ‘that this Department should do some independent thinking and not simply 
wait for Industry and Commerce or the IDA to produce ideas’..  Little wonder that 
Garret FitzGerald interpreted Economic Development, when it appeared the following 
year, as ‘the snatching by the Department of Finance of the initiative in planning’.”
93  
 
Economic Development in turn proved invaluable to Fianna Fáil by providing political 
cover for its U-turn on economic policy, as both FitzGerald and Lee have noted.
94  “It 
may be surmised”, Lee writes, “that Lemass had little ambition to inflict on his 
backbenchers, or on de Valera, the enlightenment that would be willingly proffered 
from the opposition benches about the manner in which Fianna Fáil had at last seen 
the light, and was now reneging on its earlier self..  The de-politicisation of ‘planning’ 




McCarthy has commented on how closely the new Fianna Fáil policy from 1957 
matched Costello’s proposals for industry.
96  David McCullough writes that “Costello 
could certainly claim that his government had started to pursue policies very similar 
to those in Economic Development before it left office.  Costello’s plan was based on 
the incorrect assumption that agriculture would be the main driving force of 
expansion – but so was Whitaker’s.”
97   
 
The conventional focus on Whitaker and Lemass tends to ignore the co-evolution of 
economic thinking in the major political parties.  The importance of the intense 
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electoral competition of the period is similarly downplayed.  1932 brought sixteen 
years of unbroken Fianna Fáil rule.  Each of the four general elections from 1948 
instituted a change of government.  Along with the depth of the 1950s recession, this 
further incentivised Fianna Fáil to reexamine its policies.  Lemass has admitted that 
“it was not until our second period in opposition that we really got down to thinking 
in a serious way about the post-war economic problems of the country and preparing 
our minds for a comprehensive approach to them.”
98  The evolution in Fianna Fáil 
thinking was clearly influenced by inter-party government initiatives including the 
Capital Investment Advisory Committee, the Industrial Development Authority, the 
Irish Export Board (the forerunner of Córas Tráchtála), the extension of the industrial 
grants scheme, and of course EPTR. 
 
The conventional wisdom, in crediting Whitaker and Lemass in partnership as the 
architects of the new outward-orientation of the economy, also arguably blurs the 
distinction in approach between the two.  Whitaker’s economic liberalism stands in 
contrast to the dirigisme of Lemass.
99  Sweetman would receive Whitaker’s warm 
endorsement many years later, when the latter told Bruce Arnold in an interview in 
August 1986 that his former Finance Minister “had both the energy and capacity to 
carry a thing like Economic Development through”.
100  
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